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1 Paul Schwartz, ‘Data Processing and Government Administration: The
Failure of the American Legal Response to the Computer’, (1992) 43
#

other electronic communications, online data storage,
credit and debit card payments, wire transfers, social
networking, remote monitoring, internet photo- and
video-sharing services, browsing and searching, online
commerce, and thousands of other services result in
vast quantities of personal data being held by third
parties. Increasingly, governments view these third
parties as a ready, efficient, and cost-effective source of
data about individuals and organizations.
In recent decades, governments around the world
have obligated a wide variety of businesses to collect,
retain, and share data about their customers and clients
to assist in curtailing money laundering, drug trafficking, tax evasion, terrorism, and other offences. Governments have sought access to personal information held
by the private sector not only by asking companies to
produce specific records about a single target or a small
number of people at a time but increasingly via what
we refer to here as ‘systematic’ government access. As
used throughout this issue, this term refers both to (1)
direct access by the government to private-sector databases, without the mediation or interaction of an employee or agent of the entity holding the data, and (2)
government access, whether or not mediated by a
company, to large volumes of private-sector data.
Government demands for systematic access are noteworthy because of the potential number and scope of
records involved, the fact that the records disclosed
may pertain to broad groups of individuals who are
not suspected of wrongdoing, the fact that the individuals affected need not be citizens of or even resident
within the territory of the government seeking the data,
and the low—and declining—costs to governments
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Hastings Law Journal 1321, 1325 (emphasis in original). For more recent
overviews, which confirm Prof. Schwartz’s prescient description, see Ian
Brown, ‘Data Protection: The New Technical and Political Environment’,
(2010) 20/6 Computers & Law,; ‘A Report on the Surveillance Society:
For the Information Commissioner [UK], by the Surveillance Studies
Network’ (Sep. 2006).
See generally Fred H Cate, ‘Government Data Mining: The Need for a
Legal Framework’, (2008) 43 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law
Review 436.
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Governments around the world have long sought
access to personal information about individuals. The
past half century witnessed the rise of what Professor
Paul Schwartz has described as the ‘data processing
model of administrative control’,1 in which data are
routinely collected and used for many purposes including to deliver social services, administer tax programmes and collect revenue, issue licences, support
hundreds of regulatory regimes ranging from voter
registration to employee identity verification, operate
public facilities such as toll roads and national parks,
and for law enforcement and national security.2
Government appetite for information about individuals has intensified in the twenty-first century, largely
fed by three developments. The first is the appearance
of new and dangerous threats to national security,
demonstrated by terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid, London, Mumbai, and elsewhere and
compounded by the rise in militant Islamic fundamentalism and increased concerns about chemical and
nuclear weapons and cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The
second is the explosion in the volume of digital data
routinely generated, collected, and stored about individuals’ purchases, communications, relationships, movements, finances, tastes—in fact, about almost every
aspect of people’s lives in the industrialized world—
and the ever growing power of technologies to collect,
store, and mine such data.
The third is that most of these data are collected and
stored by third parties, often by service providers as a
necessary incident to providing the service or because
the data have independent value to third parties for
marketing, research, or other purposes. Email and
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† When access sweeps in the communications and
stored data of commercial entities, trade secrets and
sensitive business information may be put at risk.
† The technical measures deployed on private systems
and networks to support systematic access may
introduce security vulnerabilities.3
† Given the lack of transparency about national practices and misunderstandings about different countries’ legal regimes, competition may be distorted as
business customers shop for jurisdictions in which
they believe their data may be less exposed to government access, and governments may use claimed disparities in laws to advantage domestic service providers
† Innovation may be limited if services must be
designed to ensure government access.
† Lack of public trust may make individuals hesitant
to use new services and new business models.4

4

5

Susan Landau, Surveillance or Security? The Risks Posed by New
Wiretapping Technologies (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 2011).
See, for example, Deven McGraw, James X Dempsey, Leslie Harris, and
Janlori Goldman, ‘Privacy as an Enabler, Not an Impediment: Building
Trust into Health Information Exchange’, (2009) 28 Health Affairs 416,
417 (citing public concerns with electronic health records and evidence
that patients will withhold information from doctors if not assured that
it will be protected against inappropriate use or disclosure).
Alan Charles Raul, ‘Preventing Digital Trade War in the Cloud’,
Washington Times, 31 Oct. 2011, at B1.
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Id. See generally Paul M Schwartz, ‘Systematic Government Access to
Private-Sector Data in Germany’, (2012) 2/4 International Data Privacy
Law doi: 10.1093/idpl/ips026.
British Columbia Bill 73—the Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Amendment Act, 2004, sect. 30.1; Bill No. 19—the Nova Scotia
Personal Information International Disclosure Protection Act, 2006, sect.
5(1); Québec Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies
and the Protection of Personal Information, sect. 70.1 (added by 2006,
c. 22, s. 47); Alberta Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act, sect. 40(1)(g); Canada Privacy Act, sect. 8(2)(c).

Downloaded from http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/ at Indiana University Libraries on August 26, 2015

These issues have proven especially controversial in the
context of cloud computing. While the provision of
services from, and the storage of data in, large shared
facilities that are accessible around the world provides
advantages in terms of efficiency, data security, and
cost, fear of broad government access to stored data is
being cited as a basis for restricting the deployment
and use of cloud services. For example, the Data
Protection Commissioner of Schleswig-Holstein in
Germany ruled in 2011 that under certain circumstances personal data could only be stored in cloud

computing facilities located within the 27 member
states of the European Union.5 In September 2011, the
Dutch Minister of Safety and Justice blocked US providers of cloud computing services from bidding on
Dutch government contracts because of fear that US
law permits too much government access to personal
information held by the private sector.6 Canadian provinces have adopted similar restrictions on allowing
personal information held by the public-sector to be
stored or accessed from outside of Canada.7
While the contretemps over government access to
data in the cloud may be motivated in part by trade
and other political issues unconnected to privacy, it
also reflects (indeed, it may take advantage of) a profound lack of knowledge about the extent to which
most governments systematically collect and use personal data from third-parties—for myriad purposes—
and the extent to which national data protection laws
permit this.
In 2011, The Privacy Projects (TPP), a not-for-profit
organization dedicated to improving current privacy
policies, practices, and technologies through research,
collaboration, and education, undertook to address this
knowledge gap. It solicited proposals from privacy
experts in academia and advocacy, and ultimately partnered with Indiana University and the Center for Democracy & Technology to plan and execute a project on
Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data.
Fred Cate and Jim Dempsey directed the project; Ira
Rubinstein and Ronald D. Lee, a partner of the law
firm of Arnold & Porter LLP, served as senior advisors.
The first phase of the project involved commissioning
short, scholarly papers from leading experts on the law
and recent controversies concerning systematic access
in nine countries: Australia, Canada, China, Germany,
India, Israel, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Each of the authors was asked to follow
a common template and to provide the most current
information available.
In addition, we invited two additional papers that
we believed would be relevant and useful to understanding current controversies over systematic government access to private-sector data. The first addresses

seeking the data. In addition to demanding systematic
access, governments are requiring private-sector entities
to retain data so they are available when the government asks or requiring service providers to design their
systems to facilitate government access.
Systematic government access to records held by
third parties raises substantial challenges for individuals
whose communications, transactions, and other activities are exposed to government scrutiny. But systematic access also creates challenges for businesses—both
providers of digital services and the commercial customers of those services—that go beyond privacy concerns. These challenges include:
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1. Lack of transparency—Most of the authors, despite
being experts in their respective countries’ datarelated laws, noted the difficulty inherent in assessing
not only the activities, but even the laws concerning
systematic access to government data. The difficulty
begins with the fact that, even though laws or regulations defining governmental powers to access data
are generally public, those laws and regulations are
often vague or ambiguous, so it is hard to tell from
reading them what the government is actually doing.
Interpretations of the law are often not made public.
Even when the law seems clear, its application in
practice is often secret. National security practices
are normally ‘classified’ and it is often hard to get a
comprehensive picture of practices in criminal cases.
8

9

Sunil Abraham, ‘Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data in
India’, (2012) 2/4 International Data Privacy Law doi: 10.1093/idpl/
ips028.
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in
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Other factors that contribute to this lack of transparency, some of which are addressed in greater detail
below, include the absence of oversight or reporting
mechanisms applicable to systematic government
access, the fact that government access occurs across
many government departments without any centralized source of information, and the fact that, while
some private-sector entities act only under compulsory process, others volunteer or sell data to
governments.
2. Significant expansion in systematic access—Despite
the difficulties with transparency, in every country
addressed by these papers there is evidence of a significant expansion in government demands for
private-sector data in general and for broad, systematic access in particular. The papers reflect expansive
mandatory reporting of financial transactional
information, air passenger and visitor data, communications-related data (eg, subscriber or device information), and other categories. Data collection by
governments appears to be on the rise across the
countries our colleagues addressed. At the same
time, private-sector organizations are facing increased requirements to collect, verify, and retain information on their customers and employees. Sunil
Abraham could be describing most of the countries
we studied when he writes about India: ‘typically all
employers must disclose business transactions to the
government, doctors must report the occurrence of
specific diseases, and banks must report suspicious
transactions that could be connected to money laundering. A growing global trend, though, that has also
begun in India, is systematic governmental access,
disclosure, retention, and collection of information
for the purposes of surveillance, national security,
and crime detection.’8 The European Union’s Data
Retention Directive is another example of the trend
Abraham identifies.9
3. Significant commonality across laws—There was a
surprising degree of commonality in the principles
and fundamental concepts reflected in the data
privacy laws of most of the countries surveyed: data
collection for law enforcement and national security
are either exempted from general data protection
laws or constitute permissible uses under those laws,
subject to varying restrictions; there is some reliance
Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic
Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks and
Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, [2006] OJ L105/54.
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the constitutional privacy jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court of the United States, a nation whose
privacy laws are shaped by that jurisprudence and are
often at issue in controversies over transnational government access to personal information. The second
paper addresses the role of encryption in government
access to data and the extent to which encryption technologies and practices may influence governments’
desire to access data stored in the cloud.
Those eleven papers provided the background for a
day-long workshop of industry, not-for-profit, and academic experts (including authors of several of the
papers) in Washington in April 2012. The discussion
there reinforced many of the findings of the papers and
helped to identify cross-cutting themes. It also guided
TPP on possible next steps to reduce the knowledge
gap among nations as to their laws and practices concerning broad government access to data held by third
parties. After the workshop, the paper authors had an
opportunity to revise and update their papers.
The papers that appear in this issue provide detailed
information about the laws and publicly reported activities relating to systematic government access to privatesector data in the nine countries. Each of the authors
has provided a brief abstract; to try to summarize them
further would be unnecessarily duplicative.
However, what first struck us and many of the participants in the workshop when we read the papers were
the broad themes that many of the papers—and the
laws and practices of the countries they reported on—
had in common. We highlight eight of those here:
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broad access to private-sector data.’13 The result is
that data collection and use for national security and
law enforcement purposes is often excluded from
oversight applicable to other data processing activities or subject to far less transparent standards and
oversight regimes.
6. The declining ‘wall’ between national security and
other uses—The impact of the broad exceptions for
national security and law enforcement activities is
expanded by the fact that in most of the countries
studied, data collected for one purpose may be used
for other legitimate government activities, and the
‘wall’ that historically limited the use of data collected under the relaxed standards applicable to national security is disappearing. For example, the
United Kingdom’s Counter-Terrorism Act of 2008
explicitly provides: ‘Information obtained by any of
the intelligence services in connection with the exercise of any of its functions may be used by that
service in connection with the exercise of any of its
other functions.’14 As Paul Schwartz writes, typical
of all of the countries studied, ‘a significant development in Germany since 9/11, and, indeed, since the
end of the Cold War, has been a steady stream of legislation that expands the powers of the BKA, BND,
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution,
as well as related agencies, and an increase in their
ability to work together and to share information.’15
Sunil Abraham puts it more bluntly in the case of
India: ‘Standards for governmental use of accessed
information vary across sectors, and in most cases
are non-existent.’16 ‘Use limitation’ is a key element
of fair information practice principles. When combined with the greater ease with which national
security and law enforcement gain access to privatesector data in the first place, the expanding freedom
to share that information among agencies and use it
for purposes beyond those for which it was collected
represents a substantial weakening of traditional data
protections.
7. ‘Systematic volunteerism’—The papers that follow
suggest that the most frequent way that governments
obtain systematic access to private-sector information
is by asking for it, what one workshop participant

10 Konrad Litschko, ‘Polizei sammelte Handydaten’, taz, (23 Jan. 2012)
(quoted in Paul M Schwartz, ‘Systematic Government Access to PrivateSector Data in Germany’, (n 6).
11 Eric Lichtblau, ‘More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance’,
New York Times, 8 July 2012, at A1.
12 David Leppard, ‘Government to Snoop All Emails’, Sunday Times of
London, 1 Apr. 2012, at 1.

13 Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, ‘Systematic Government Access to PrivateSector Data in Australia’, (2012) 2/4 International Data Privacy Law doi:
10.1093/idpl/ips021.
14 Counter-Terrorism Act of 2008 § 19 (quoted in Ian Brown, ‘Government
Access to Private-Sector Data in the United Kingdom’, (2012) 2/4
International Data Privacy Law doi: 10.1093/idpl/ips018).
15 Schwartz, (n 6).
16 Abraham, (n 8).
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on (and tension around the adequacy of) external
approval or review mechanisms to oversee such
access, whether a court, high-ranking government
officials, or a committee established for the purpose,
such as the German G-10 Commission; and the laws
and regulations that are in place focus on individual
requests for specific data to the complete or near exclusion of addressing systematic government access.
Some other common themes are addressed in
greater detail below.
4. Inconsistency between law and practice—Many
authors report perceived inconsistencies between
what the law says and what their respective governments are reportedly doing. This does not necessarily
mean that the activity is illegal, but rather that it
occurs subject to a legal interpretation that is withheld from the public or takes place in the interstices
of national regulation. For example, the Berlin police
have reportedly obtained information on 4.2 million
cell phone conversations since 2008;10 US law enforcement officials made at least 1.3 million
demands for text messages, caller locations, and
other subscriber information from cell phone carriers in 2011;11 and the British government has
announced plans to require internet companies to
install devices to allow government access to ‘phone
calls, text messages and emails as they are made’.12
The difficulty in squaring the magnitude of access to
sensitive data reflected in these and other examples
with the respect for privacy often asserted by officials
in these countries further illustrates how hard it is to
achieve an accurate and comprehensive understanding of actual law and practice.
5. National security and law enforcement exceptions—As
noted above, in countries with otherwise comprehensive data protection laws, national security and
law enforcement are often excluded from such laws,
or are broadly accepted purposes for which such
access is permissible. This proved to be the case in
every country we examined, even in those nations
with the most well developed data protection
regimes. For example, Dan Svantesson writes that
Australian laws ‘taken together ... provide Australian
law enforcement and national security agencies with
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In sum, analysis of government demands for systematic
access must begin with the recognition that, even in
countries with the broadest and most systematic data
protection laws, data collection and use for national security and law enforcement are generally beyond the
scope of those laws or constitute an express exception
to them. The separate laws that do set standards for
government surveillance and access are often ambigu-

17 Brown, (n 14).
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ous, allow great latitude in the area of national security,
and are being outpaced recently by technology. In addition, for many years there have been mandatory
reporting requirements in every country surveyed that
force the private sector to report varying amounts of
sensitive personal information to the government for
routine administrative and regulatory purposes; such
requirements have always represented a certain disconnect between data protection law and the reality of government access to and use of private-sector data. Now,
on top of these realities, to varying degrees, governments worldwide are seeking systematic access to
private-sector data, for which the already limited or
outdated legal frameworks provide little assurance of
proportionality, transparency, or accountability.
Taken together, these global trends suggest that it is
time to recognize that the challenges of government
access are widespread and should not, at least among
the democratic countries, be the basis for cross-border
polemics. Instead, global companies, governments committed to human rights, and privacy advocates should
undertake a serious dialogue leading to a better understanding of current practices and of the legitimate
needs of governments, businesses, and individuals, thus
contributing to the development of more effective frameworks for privacy protection, commerce, and governmental interests. We offer the following papers as
one initial step in that process.
We are grateful to the authors of the eleven papers
included in this issue for their excellent work under a
tight deadline, and to the editors of International Data
Privacy Law for devoting a single issue to making these
important pieces available to a wide audience. We also
wish to thank the participants in the April 2012 workshop. Finally, we wish to thank the board of directors
of The Privacy Projects for their support throughout
this project and for their commitment to expanding
multinational understanding of laws and practices relating to systematic government access to private-sector
data, both now and in the future.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ips027
Advance Access Publication 17 September 2012

18 Jane Bailey, ‘Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data in
Canada’, (2012) 2/4 International Data Privacy Law doi: 10.1093/idpl/
ips016.
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labelled ‘systematic volunteerism’. What Ian Brown
writes about the United Kingdom appears to apply
to most of the countries studied: ‘The most plausible
means for systematic UK government access to
private-sector data is through voluntary agreements
with the operators of systems and databases.’17 Governments often claim that such arrangements are
permitted under existing legal frameworks and are
justified as simply making more efficient that which
is already permitted. Companies establishing such
arrangements appear motivated by a variety of
factors including patriotism, a desire for good relations with government agencies (both for regulatory
and sales purposes), a lack of understanding that national law does not require compliance with such
requests, fear of reprisals if they do not cooperate,
and the ability to generate revenue by selling the
government access to the data they possess.
8. Importance of multinational access and sharing—
Finally, most of the nations surveyed appear to consider cross-border access to data essential to national
security, law enforcement, and other government activities. Most assert the authority under their national laws to access data stored in other countries, both
by means of demands enforced against the domestic
officers of the data custodian and by seeking access
through foreign partners under bilateral or multilateral agreements. Jane Bailey captures a common
theme when she writes about Canada’s first comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy that a ‘key priority of the strategy appears to be ensuring
information exchange between and amongst these
domestic players, as well as with similar agencies
acting for international partners.’18
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